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8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO

10 In re MENLO THERAPEUTICS INC.) Lead Case No. 18CIV06049
SECURITIES LITIGATION)
11 _____) CLASS ACTION
12 This Document Relates To:) Assigned for All Purposes to Dept. 16
ALL ACTIONS.)
13 _____) PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
14 MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND
APPROVAL OF PLAN OF ALLOCATION
15
16 Date: August 14, 2020
Time: 2:00 p.m.
17 Judge: Honorable Richard H. DuBois
Dept: 16
18 Date Action Filed: 11/08/18
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1 Plaintiffs Pavel Silvestrov and Hugh McKay (together, “Plaintiffs”) respectfully submit this
2 memorandum in support of their motion for final approval of the settlement of this class action on the
3 terms set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement dated March 26, 2020 (the “Stipulation” or
4 “Settlement”), and for approval of the Plan of Allocation.¹

5 I. INTRODUCTION

6 The Settlement provides for payment by or on behalf of Defendants of \$9,500,000 for the
7 benefit of the Class.² The Settlement is the culmination of vigorous litigation, and is the product of
8 arm’s-length negotiations between the Parties³ with the substantial assistance of the Honorable Layn R.
9 Phillips (Ret.), one of the nation’s most well-respected and effective mediators of securities class
10 actions. The Settlement resolves all claims against Defendants. Lead Counsel believes that the
11 Settlement represents a highly favorable result for the Class and warrants this Court’s approval.

12 As further discussed below, the Settlement should be presumed fair because it was reached
13 through arm’s-length bargaining and Lead Counsel’s investigation and prosecution of this case assured
14

15 ¹ Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms have the meanings ascribed to them in the
16 Stipulation.

17 ² “Class” and “Class Members” means all Persons who purchased or otherwise acquired Menlo
18 Therapeutics Inc.’s common stock pursuant and/or traceable to the Registration Statement and
19 Prospectus issued in connection with Menlo’s January 29, 2018 initial public offering. Excluded from
20 the Class are: the Defendants (meaning, the Menlo Defendants and the Underwriter Defendants) and
21 their respective successors and assigns; past and current executive officers and directors of Menlo and
22 the Underwriter Defendants; members of the immediate families of the Menlo Defendants; the legal
23 representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns of the Menlo Defendants; any entity in which any of the
24 above excluded persons have or had a majority ownership interest; and any person who validly requests
25 exclusion from the Class. The foregoing exclusion shall not cover “Investment Vehicles,” which for
26 these purposes shall mean any investment company or pooled investment fund, including, but not
27 limited to, mutual fund families, exchange-traded funds, fund of funds, private equity funds, real estate
28 funds, and hedge funds, in which any Underwriter Defendant or any of its affiliates has or may have a
direct or indirect interest or as to which any Underwriter Defendant or any of its affiliates may act as an
investment advisor, general partner, managing member, or in other similar capacity, other than an
investment vehicle of which the Underwriter Defendant or any of its affiliates is a majority owner or
holds a majority beneficial interest and only to the extent of such Underwriter Defendant’s or affiliate’s
ownership or interest. Stipulation, ¶1.4.

³ “Parties” shall mean Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, and Defendants Menlo
Therapeutics Inc. (“Menlo” or the “Company”), Steven Basta, Kristine Ball, Paul Berns, Albert Cha,
Ted Ebel, David McGirr, Aaron Royston, and Scott Whitcup (the “Individual Defendants” and with
Menlo, the “Menlo Defendants”), and Jefferies LLC, Piper Sandler & Co., Guggenheim Securities,
LLC, and JPM Securities LLC (the “Underwriter Defendants”) (all, collectively, “Defendants”).

1 that Plaintiffs entered into the Settlement on a fully informed basis. Further, Lead Counsel is
2 experienced in securities class action litigation and there have been no objections to the Settlement or
3 Plan of Allocation to date.

4 Moreover, there is nothing to rebut the presumption of fairness. While Plaintiffs and Lead
5 Counsel believe that the litigation has substantial merit and they would have prevailed at trial, they
6 considered the numerous risks raised by the arguments Defendants made during the case and in
7 settlement negotiations, as well as the risks in establishing liability and damages at trial. At trial, the
8 jury could have sided with Defendants on some or all of the determinative issues, leaving the Class with
9 little or no recovery.

10 Lead Counsel, who is well-respected and experienced in prosecuting shareholder class actions,
11 has concluded that the Settlement is a highly favorable result and in the best interest of the Class. This
12 conclusion is based on, among other things, the substantial recovery obtained when weighed against the
13 significant risk, expense and delay presented in continuing this litigation through trial and probable
14 appeal; a complete analysis of the evidence obtained; past experience in litigating complex actions
15 similar to the present action; and the serious disputes among the Parties on both merits and damages
16 issues.

17 For these and other reasons set forth below, as well as those set forth in the previously-filed
18 Declaration of James I. Jaconette in Support of Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval
19 of Class Action Settlement ("Jaconette Decl."), dated March 27, 2020,⁴ Plaintiffs respectfully request
20 that the Court grant final approval to the Settlement and approve the Plan of Allocation as fair,
21 reasonable, and adequate to Class Members.⁵

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24 ⁴ The Jaconette Declaration details Plaintiffs' claims, the procedural history of the litigation, the
25 efforts of Lead Counsel in prosecuting this case, the risks of continued litigation, and why the
Settlement is in the best interests of the Class.

26 ⁵ This memorandum focuses primarily upon the legal standards for approving the Settlement, and
27 evaluating the Plan of Allocation. A separate memorandum is being submitted herewith in support of
28 the motion for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses. For a complete factual recitation, Lead
Counsel respectfully refers the Court to the Jaconette Declaration, incorporated by reference herein.

1 **II. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, ADEQUATE, AND REASONABLE AND**
2 **WARRANTS FINAL APPROVAL**

3 **A. Standards Governing Final Approval of Class Action Settlements**

4 “A class action shall not be dismissed, settled, or compromised without the approval of the
5 court.” Cal. Civ. Code §1781(f). When assessing a proposed class action settlement, the court’s
6 inquiry centers on whether the settlement is ““fair, adequate, and reasonable.”” *Dunk v. Ford Motor*
7 *Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1801 (1996). The inquiry ““must be limited to the extent necessary to reach
8 a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion
9 between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and
10 adequate to all concerned.”” *Id.*⁶

11 Accordingly, the Court need not inquire into the result that might have been obtained at trial.
12 *See Wershba v. Apple Comput., Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245 (2001), *overruled on other grounds by*
13 *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.*, 4 Cal. 5th 260 (2018). A review of the likely rewards of
14 settlement and the risks and costs of continued litigation suffices. *See North Cty. Contractor’s Ass’n v.*
15 *Touchstone Ins. Servs.*, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1091 (1994) (court must determine if settlement is in the
16 “ballpark”). ““In most situations, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and
17 approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.”” *Nat’l Rural*
18 *Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004).⁷ Further, longstanding
19 public policy strongly favors settlements. *See, e.g., Hamilton v. Oakland Sch. Dist.*, 219 Cal. 322, 329
20 (1933) (“[I]t is the policy of the law to discourage litigation and to favor compromises.”). This policy
21 becomes an “overriding public interest” in class actions. *Bell v. Am. Title Ins. Co.*, 226 Cal. App. 3d
22 1589, 1608 (1991).

23 In determining whether a settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, there is a “presumption of
24 fairness . . . where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and
25 discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in

26 ⁶ Unless otherwise noted, citations are omitted and emphasis is added throughout.

27 ⁷ California courts also look to the standards developed by federal courts in reviewing and approving
28 class action settlements. *See, e.g., La Sala v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n*, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 872 (1971).

1 similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802; *see*
2 *also Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1389 (2010) (same).

3 The court in *Dunk* set forth additional factors to be considered along with this presumption,
4 including (1) the settlement amount; (2) the risks of continued litigation; (3) the stage of proceedings;
5 (4) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation absent settlement; (5) the experience
6 and views of class counsel; and (6) the reaction of class members. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801. As
7 discussed below, the Settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairness, and readily satisfies the
8 additional *Dunk* factors.

9 **B. The Settlement Should Be Accorded a Presumption of Fairness**

10 The Settlement is presumptively fair.

11 *First*, the Parties negotiated the Settlement at arm’s length under the direct supervision of
12 former Judge Layn R. Phillips (Ret.), a highly experienced and effective mediator in cases like this. *See*
13 *In re Delphi Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.*, 248 F.R.D. 483, 498 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (“[T]he
14 Court and the parties have had the added benefit of the insight and considerable talents of a former
15 federal judge who is one of the most prominent and highly skilled mediators of complex actions.”). The
16 negotiations included a day-long mediation session during which the Parties’ positions on merits and
17 damages issues were fully vetted and informed by detailed mediation briefs and supporting materials
18 exchanged in advance of the negotiations. *See* *Jaconette Decl.*, ¶¶16-19.

19 *Second*, the Parties engaged in extensive pretrial investigation and discovery and other
20 proceedings to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses, and therefore entered
21 into the Settlement on a fully informed basis. Lead Counsel, among other things:

- 22 (a) conducted an extensive factual investigation of the events underlying Menlo’s
23 January 29, 2018 IPO, including ongoing witness investigation and interviews,
24 reviewing and analyzing the representations made by the Company in the Registration
25 Statement, as well as subsequent U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filings, and
26 reviewing industry and securities analyst reports and comprehensive news reports, press
27 releases and other media files concerning Menlo;

- 1 (b) drafted and filed the Complaint;
- 2 (c) briefed, argued, and successfully defeated Defendants’ demurrers to the Complaint on
- 3 the §11 claim;
- 4 (d) drafted and propounded document requests to all Defendants;
- 5 (e) met and conferred extensively with Defendants to resolve disputes about the scope of
- 6 Defendants’ search for and production of documents in response to the document
- 7 requests, the custodians from whom documents would be produced, the relevant time
- 8 period and the search terms to be utilized by Defendants to identify and produce
- 9 relevant and responsive documents, and the collection and processing of attachments to
- 10 hundreds of emails;
- 11 (f) obtained, searched, reviewed, and analyzed over 261,000 documents (over 2 million
- 12 pages) produced by Defendants;
- 13 (g) retained and consulted with a forensic damages consultant regarding the calculation of
- 14 damages under the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”); and
- 15 (h) analyzed, briefed and presented evidence in support of the claims of the Class at
- 16 mediation.

17 Jaconette Decl., ¶15. Given these substantial efforts, Lead Counsel plainly was in a position to

18 negotiate the Settlement based on a fully informed evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the

19 claims asserted, the defenses raised, and the risks of continued litigation.

20 **Third**, although the Court must independently review the Settlement, the judgment of

21 experienced counsel regarding the Settlement is entitled to great weight and supports a presumption of

22 fairness. *See Nat’l Rural*, 221 F.R.D. at 528 (“Great weight is accorded to the recommendation of

23 counsel, who are most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation.”); *Dunk*, 48 Cal.

24 App. 4th at 1802. Lead Counsel here has extensive experience and expertise in the prosecution of

25 securities class actions in federal and state courts throughout the country. *See Jaconette Decl.*, Ex. A

26 (Robbins Geller resume). Lead Counsel fully supports the Settlement, and believes that the substantial

27 and certain recovery of \$9,500,000 is a highly favorable result for the Class when weighed against the

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1 uncertainty and substantial risk and expense of continuing this litigation through trial and appeals. *Id.*,
2 ¶¶20-25. The fact that qualified and well-informed counsel endorse the Settlement as being fair,
3 adequate, and reasonable favors this Court’s approval of the Settlement.

4 **Fourth**, the reaction of the Class to the Settlement supports a presumption of fairness. Pursuant
5 to the Court’s Notice Order, more than 10,900 copies of the Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class
6 Action (“Notice”) were sent to potential Class Members and their nominees. *See* Declaration of
7 Ross D. Murray Regarding Notice Dissemination, Publication, and Requests for Exclusion Received to
8 Date (“Murray Decl.”), ¶11, submitted herewith. The Notice described the nature of the litigation, the
9 terms of the Settlement, and the manner in which the Net Settlement Fund will be allocated among
10 Class Members and an estimate of the per share recovery. The Notice also advised Class Members of
11 their right to object and the procedures and deadline for objecting to the Settlement, the Plan of
12 Allocation, and/or counsel’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses. In addition, the
13 Summary Notice was transmitted over *Business Wire* and published in *The Wall Street Journal* on
14 May 22, 2020. *Id.*, ¶12. The Notice, Stipulation, and other relevant documents and information,
15 including all deadlines, have been made publicly available on a case-dedicated website for the
16 Settlement, www.MenloSecuritiesLitigation.com. *Id.*, ¶14.

17 Although Class Members have until July 24, 2020 to object or exclude themselves from the
18 Class, Lead Counsel is not aware of any objections to the Settlement or the Plan of Allocation as of the
19 date hereof, and no requests for exclusion from the Class have been received. *See id.*, ¶16. The lack of
20 objections by the Class to date supports a presumption of fairness.⁸ *See 7-Eleven Owners for Fair*
21 *Franchising v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1153 (2000) (one factor that “lead[s] to a
22 presumption the settlement was fair” is that only “a small percentage of objectors” came forward); *Nat’l*
23 *Rural*, 221 F.R.D. at 529 (small number of objections raises strong presumption that settlement is fair).

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27 ⁸ If any objections are received, Plaintiffs will address them in a reply memorandum to be filed on
28 August 7, 2020, in accordance with this Court’s Notice Order.

1 **C. The Settlement Readily Satisfies the Additional *Dunk* Factors**

2 **1. The Amount of the Settlement Balanced Against the Strength of**
3 **Plaintiffs’ Case Favors Approval**

4 Each of the additional *Dunk* factors supports final approval. Under the Settlement, the Company
5 and certain of its insurers have paid \$9,500,000 in cash for the benefit of the Class, with no right of
6 reversion. This \$9,500,000 Settlement, if approved, would be comfortably in the range of court-
7 approved settlements in recent years in class actions asserting federal statutory claims in California
8 Superior Court for alleged material misstatements in the offering documents for a public stock offering.

9 Based on the assumption that Plaintiffs would meet their burden of proof and persuade the jury
10 at trial as to each element of their *prima facie* claims, and that Plaintiffs would successfully rebut every
11 affirmative defense Defendants intended to establish, maximum estimated damages could reach as high
12 as \$75.1 million. Accordingly, the percentage of recovery is approximately 13%, well above the
13 median settlement as a percentage of estimated damages courts have approved in cases only involving
14 §§11 and/or 12(a)(2) claims. See Laarni T. Bulan & Laura E. Simmons, *Securities Class Action*
15 *Settlements – 2019 Review and Analysis* at 7, Fig. 6 (Cornerstone Research 2020) (analyzing 77 class
16 action settlements asserting §§11 and/or 12(a)(2) claims filed between 2010 and 2019, and finding the
17 median settlement as a percentage of “simplified statutory damages” was 7.4%).⁹ Not surprisingly,
18 Defendants estimated damages at a fraction of the amount estimated by Plaintiffs’ expert, based on
19 expected loss causation affirmative defenses.

20 Regardless of the specific percentage of recovery yielded by the Settlement, however, the
21 Settlement is unquestionably better than another possibility – little or no recovery at all in view of the
22 risks of continued litigation, discussed below. See *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 250 (“Compromise is
23 inherent and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if ‘the relief afforded by the proposed
24 settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated,’ this is
25 no bar to a class settlement because ‘the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
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27 ⁹ The Cornerstone Research report is available online at: [https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/](https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2019-Review-and-Analysis.pdf)
28 [Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2019-Review-and-Analysis.pdf](https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2019-Review-and-Analysis.pdf).

1 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”). This factor supports final
2 approval of the Settlement.

3 **2. The Substantial Risks of Continued Litigation**

4 **a. Risks Related to Establishing Liability**

5 While Plaintiffs believe their claims are strong on the merits, success is hardly assured. The
6 Complaint alleges that Menlo’s IPO Registration Statement and Prospectus included false and
7 misleading statements regarding clinical studies of Menlo’s drug serlopitant as a treatment for pruritus.
8 Jaconette Decl., ¶¶5-6. The Complaint further alleges that the generalized risk disclosures were false
9 and misleading because, as of the IPO, Defendants had the data exposing serlopitant as entirely
10 ineffective (no better than a placebo) for treating pruritus associated with atopic dermatitis. *Id.*, ¶7.
11 Defendants have and would continue to maintain that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the materiality or
12 falsity of any of the challenged statements in the Registration Statement and Prospectus. *Id.*, ¶11.
13 Defendants would also likely argue at the summary judgment stage and at trial that Menlo’s price
14 decline after its IPO was not attributable to any omission or misrepresentation in the Registration
15 Statement, but (to the extent Menlo even admits the drop is statistically significant, which it does not)
16 was simply consistent with overall market conditions. *See id.*, ¶23.

17 While Plaintiffs have substantial responses to these arguments, the uncertainty of continued
18 litigation weighs strongly in favor of approval of the Settlement. As one court has observed:

19 It is known from past experience that no matter how confident one may be of the
20 outcome of litigation, such confidence is often misplaced. Merely by way of example,
21 two instances in this Court may be cited where offers of settlement were rejected by
22 some plaintiffs and were disapproved by this Court. The trial in each case then resulted
23 unfavorably for plaintiffs; in one case they recovered nothing and in the other they
24 recovered less than the amount which had been offered in settlement.

25 *State of W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.*, 314 F. Supp. 710, 743-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), *aff’d*, 440 F.2d 1079
26 (2d Cir. 1971); *see also Bellows v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc.*, No. 3:07-cv-01413-W-AJB, 2008 WL 5458986,
27 at *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2008) (“[W]hile Class Counsel believe strongly in the merit of the class
28 claims, they also recognize that any case encompasses risks and that settlement of contested cases is
preferred in this circuit. Indeed, even if Plaintiff were to prevail at trial, risks to the class remain.”); *In*
re Heritage Bond Litig., No. 02-ML-1475 DT, 2005 WL 1594403, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005)

1 (“Also favoring approval of the Settlement is the knowledge that, while Plaintiffs are confident of the
2 strength of their case, it is imprudent to presume ultimate success at trial and thereafter.”) (both citing
3 *Chas. Pfizer*, 314 F. Supp. at 743-44). The numerous uncertainties and risks of proving liability at and
4 after trial support approval of the Settlement.

5 **b. Risks Relating to Establishing Causation and Damages**

6 Although Plaintiffs were confident that they could establish damages assuming a finding of
7 liability, Plaintiffs faced a risk that the Court or jury would substantially reduce or even eliminate
8 damages. Under §11(e) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77k(e), a defendant can reduce or eliminate
9 damages through a showing that the false or misleading statements or omissions alleged were not the
10 cause, in whole or in part, of the loss sustained by the class. As noted above, Defendants were likely to
11 argue “negative causation” at both summary judgment and trial.

12 The Parties’ respective experts would offer sharply divergent testimony concerning damages at
13 both summary judgment and trial, reducing the determination of this element to a “battle of the
14 experts.” *See In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig.*, 535 F. Supp. 2d 249, 260-61 (D.N.H. 2007) (fact
15 that “trial would likely involve a confusing ‘battle of the experts’ over damages” supported approval of
16 settlement). Plaintiffs faced a substantial risk that the fact finder would credit Defendants’ contentions
17 that damages were not linked to the misstatements in the offering documents or that damages were a
18 fraction of the amount Plaintiffs proffered. *See In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig.*, 618 F. Supp. 735,
19 744-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (approving settlement where “it is virtually impossible to predict with any
20 certainty which testimony would be credited, and ultimately, which damages would be found to have
21 been caused by actionable, rather than the myriad nonactionable factors such as general market
22 conditions”), *aff’d*, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).

23 Even if Plaintiffs were to obtain 100% of their damages, the risks would not end there. *See In re*
24 *Mfrs. Life Ins. Co. Premium Litig.*, No. 96-CV-230 BTM (AJB), 1998 WL 1993385, at *5 (S.D. Cal.
25 Dec. 21, 1998) (“[E]ven if it is assumed that a successful outcome for plaintiffs at summary judgment
26 or at trial would yield a greater recovery than the Settlement – which is not at all apparent – there is
27 easily enough uncertainty in the mix to support settling the dispute rather than risking no recovery in
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1 future proceedings.”). There are numerous cases in which a successful verdict has been overturned
2 either by motion after trial or an appeal. In *In re Apple Comput. Sec. Litig.*, No. C-84-20148(A)-JW,
3 1991 WL 238298, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 1991), for example, the jury rendered a verdict for plaintiffs
4 after an extended trial. Based upon the jury’s findings, recoverable damages would have exceeded
5 \$100 million. The court, however, overturned the verdict, entered judgment for the individual
6 defendants, and ordered a new trial with respect to the corporate defendant. *See also, e.g., Glickenhau*
7 *& Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc.*, 787 F.3d 408, 433 (7th Cir. 2015) (reversing and remanding jury verdict
8 of \$2.46 billion after 13 years of litigation on loss causation grounds and error in jury instruction under
9 *Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders*, 564 U.S. 135 (2011)); *In re BankAtlantic Bancorp,*
10 *Inc.*, No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 WL 1585605, at *20 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2011) (after plaintiffs’ jury
11 verdict, court granted defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and entered judgment for
12 defendants), *aff’d*, 688 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding trial court erred, but defendants nevertheless
13 entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on lack of loss causation). Litigation risks on liability and
14 damages support approval of the Settlement.

15 **3. Plaintiffs Had Sufficient Information to Negotiate and Obtain a**
16 **Fair Settlement**

17 This factor focuses on whether the Parties had sufficient information to conduct an informed
18 negotiation for a settlement that adequately reflects the merits of the case.

19 As detailed above, when the Parties reached the Settlement, Lead Counsel had sufficiently
20 investigated and researched the merits of their claims and Defendants’ potential defenses to determine
21 that the terms of the Settlement are fair, reasonable, and adequate and in the best interests of the Class.
22 Lead Counsel’s reasoned judgment was obtained after it briefed Defendants’ demurrers; propounded
23 document requests on the Menlo Defendants; reviewed and analyzed over 2 million pages of
24 documents; and participated in mediated settlement negotiations during which the strengths and
25 weaknesses of the Parties’ positions were fully explored and debated. Jaconette Decl., ¶¶9-15. The
26 knowledge and insight gained through these activities provided Lead Counsel with sufficient
27 information to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the Class’ claims and Defendants’ defenses, as
28 well as the likelihood of obtaining a larger recovery from Defendants had the litigation continued.

1 Class action settlements are regularly approved after having completed similar or less discovery
2 than that completed here. *See, e.g., Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*, 186 Cal.
3 App. 4th 399, 403 (2010) (final approval of class action affirmed when no depositions had been taken,
4 just written discovery). This factor weighs significantly in favor of approval.

5 **4. Balancing the Certainty of an Immediate Recovery Against the**
6 **Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of Continued**
7 **Litigation and Trial Favors Settlement**

8 The immediacy and certainty of a recovery balanced against the complexity, expense and
9 duration of continued litigation is another factor for the Court to balance in determining whether the
10 Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *See Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 244-45; *Dunk*, 48 Cal.
11 App. 4th at 1801. The benefit of the present settlement must be balanced against the expense of
12 achieving a more favorable result at a trial in the future.

13 Approval of the Settlement assures a prompt and significant recovery for Class Members. If not
14 for the Settlement, this litigation would continue to proceed through the completion of document and
15 deposition discovery, expert discovery, summary judgment, trial, and likely appeal. A trial would
16 occupy teams of attorneys for weeks and would require substantial and costly expert testimony on both
17 sides. Further, a judgment favorable to the Class, in light of the contested nature of virtually every
18 aspect of this case, would unquestionably be the subject of post-trial motions and appeals, which would
19 prolong the case for several more years. *See Warner Commc'ns*, 618 F. Supp. at 745 (delay from
20 appeals is factor to be considered). Delay, not just at the trial stage, but through post-trial motions and
21 the appellate process as well, could force Class Members to wait many more years for any recovery,
22 further reducing its value. Settlement of this litigation ensures an immediate recovery, and eliminates
23 the risk of no recovery at all.

24 The essence of a settlement is compromise, “a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of
25 highest hopes.” *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n*, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982). “[T]he
26 agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and
27 elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with
28

1 litigation.” *Id.* The certainty of recovery balanced against the complexity, expense, and duration of
2 continued litigation weighs in favor of approval of the Settlement. *See* Jaconette Decl., ¶27.

3 **5. The Recommendation of Experienced Counsel Favor Approval of**
4 **the Settlement**

5 The views of the attorneys actively conducting the litigation, while not conclusive, are entitled
6 to weight in the fairness analysis. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802; *see also In re Omnivision Techs.,*
7 *Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel
8 should be given a presumption of reasonableness.”). Lead Counsel, who has extensive experience in
9 the prosecution of securities class actions, recommends the Settlement to the Court as in the best
10 interests of the Class.¹⁰ *See* Jaconette Decl., ¶¶26-28 & Ex. A thereto.

11 In sum, because each of the *Dunk* factors supports a finding that the Settlement is fair,
12 reasonable, and adequate, the Court should approve the Settlement.

13 **III. THE PLAN OF ALLOCATION IS FAIR AND REASONABLE AND SHOULD**
14 **BE APPROVED**

15 Plaintiffs also seek approval of the Plan of Allocation. The Plan of Allocation is set forth in full
16 in the Notice mailed to potential Class Members. *See* Murray Decl., Ex. A (Notice at 3-4). Assessment
17 of a plan of allocation in a class action is governed by the same standards of review applicable to the
18 settlement as a whole – the plan must be fair and reasonable. *See Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle*, 955
19 F.2d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 1992). An allocation formula “need only have a reasonable, rational basis,
20 particularly if recommended by experienced and competent” class counsel. *See, e.g., In re Zynga Inc.*
21 *Sec. Litig.*, No. 12- cv-04007-JSC, 2015 WL 6471171, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2015). No objections
22 to the Plan of Allocation have been filed to date.

23 The Plan of Allocation provides an equitable basis to allocate the Net Settlement Fund among
24 all Class Members who submit an acceptable Proof of Claim. The Plan of Allocation was developed by
25 Lead Counsel with the assistance of their damages consultant, reflects an assessment of the damages
26 that could have been recovered at trial and follows the statutory framework for calculating damages

27 ¹⁰ The reaction of the Class is also relevant to the fairness of the Settlement. *See Dunk*, 48 Cal. App.
28 4th at 1801. As noted above, there have been no objections or exclusions to date. If any timely
objections are submitted, Plaintiffs will address them in a reply memorandum. *See* footnote 8, *supra*.

1 under §11(e) of the Securities Act. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Plan of
2 Allocation is a fair and reasonable method for allocating the Net Settlement Fund among the members
3 of the Class.

4 **IV. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT FINAL CERTIFICATION OF THE CLASS**

5 In its Notice Order, the Court preliminarily certified the Class for settlement purposes, thereby
6 recognizing that Plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure §382.
7 Notice Order at 2. Since the Court's Notice Order, nothing has changed to disturb the Court's conclusion
8 that class treatment is appropriate, and there is good reason and just cause to finally certify the Class, for
9 settlement purposes, under California Code of Civil Procedure §382.

10 **V. CONCLUSION**

11 The Settlement reached by Lead Counsel is a very good one, and for the foregoing reasons,
12 Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant final approval to the Settlement, approve the Plan of
13 Allocation, grant final certification of the Class, and enter the proposed Judgment and Order Granting
14 Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.

15 DATED: July 10, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

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DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL & EMAIL

I, June Ito, is and was, at all times herein mentioned, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County of San Diego, over the age of 18 years, and not a party to or interested party in the within action, and have a business address of 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900, San Diego, California 92101.

I hereby declare that on July 10, 2020, I served:

**PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
AND APPROVAL OF PLAN OF ALLOCATION**

on the parties in the within action by depositing a true and correct copy thereof in a United States mailbox at San Diego, California in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid and addressed to the parties listed below. I further certify that a copy was also emailed to the addresses below:

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS:


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15 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on July 10,
16 2020, at San Diego, California.

17 
18 _____
19 JUNE ITO